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Chapter 8 
‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’: 
Women’s Wages in Soviet Russia 
 
Melanie Ilic 
 
This chapter evaluates the impact of Bolshevik policy on ‘equal pay for equal work’ in the 
interwar period with specific reference to women’s wages. Russian socialist thought identified 
concerns relating to the causes and consequences of women’s low pay in the pre-
revolutionary period. The Bolsheviks introduced legislative initiatives after the October 
revolution that provided the foundation for Soviet wages policy and included the concept of 
‘equal pay for equal work’. The idealistic vision of social levelling and wage equalisation 
contained in the original statutes, however, was soon abandoned. Thereafter, acceptable levels 
of pay differentials were set within a framework determined by an overall wages strategy. The 
officially acceptable levels of inequality in pay, therefore, varied over time.  
 
The classic western studies of Soviet labour and wages policy in this period pay little 
attention to the inequalities of earnings between women and men.1 Other commentaries, 
                                                 
1 A. Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages: a Study in Socialist Economics, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1944; J.G. Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963; G.R. Barker, Some Problems of Incentives 
and Labour Productivity in Soviet Industry, Oxford: Blackwell, 1956; Birmingham Bureau of 
Research on Russian Economic Conditions, ‘Wages of Industrial Workers in the USSR’, 
Memorandum no. 6, Birmingham, 1932. 
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including those of contemporary observers, uncritically accept the policy of ‘equal pay for 
equal work’ as an accomplished fact in the Soviet Union in the interwar years. Margaret 
Dewar’s study of post-revolutionary labour policy, for example, states in parentheses that 
‘there was, of course, equal pay for equal work’, whilst Peter Francis, in his account of 
working in a Soviet factory in the 1930s, noted that ‘rates of pay for the same work by men 
and women are identical’.2 Women’s relative wage rates did improve during the interwar 
period, but whether this was the direct result of the policy of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has 
yet to be determined.  
 
In western countries under the impact of industrialisation only a small proportion of women 
were the household’s sole wage earner or main breadwinner. Women’s secondary status in 
contributing to household income was used, in part, to justify their lower wages, and has been 
identified by historians as evidence of discrimination against women. Whilst the minimum 
wage was introduced in an attempt to combat low pay and the worst excesses of industrial 
exploitation, ‘family wage’ debates presupposed an ideal of a non-working wife and the 
removal of married women from the labour force. The work which women performed within 
                                                 
2 Margaret Dewar, Labour Policy in the USSR, 1917-1928, London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1956, p. 139, notes ‘in March 1919, the average wage for a male worker 
was 83r. 19k., that for a female worker 56r. 28k’; Peter Francis, I Worked in a Soviet Factory, 
London: Jarrolds Publishers Ltd., 1939, p. 83. See also S.M. Kingsbury and M. Fairchild, 
Factory, Family and Woman in the Soviet Union, New York: Putnam, 1935; J. Freeman, The 
Soviet Worker: an Account of the Economic, Social and Cultural Status of Labour in the 
USSR, Westport, CN: Martin Lawrence, 1973 [orig. 1932]; E. Winter, Red Virtue: Human 
Relations in the New Russia, London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 104. 
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the household and in child care, needless to say, was not assigned a monetary value in either 
the West or the Soviet Union. 
 
In an article investigating female-male wage ratios during the industrial revolution in Britain, 
Joyce Burnette argued contrary to the view that women received a ‘customary wage’ (that is, 
one which reflected their secondary status in the industrial labour force) and that women 
were, in fact, paid a ‘market wage’, which reflected their true economic contribution in a 
competitive labour market.3 Burnette suggests that women workers paid on time-rates 
received lower wages because they worked fewer hours, and female piece-rate workers earned 
lower wages because they produced less. Her findings suggest that women, on the whole, 
were paid a wage, albeit lower than men’s, which related directly to their levels of 
productivity, output and hours of work. She concluded that, ‘there was no obvious 
incongruence between wages and productivity. Women seem to have been paid market 
wages, and the assertion that women were paid customary wages needs to be revised’.4 
 
 
Women’s Wages in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: 
In her study of women’s industrial employment in pre-revolutionary Russia, Rose Glickman 
notes that, despite a closer parity of wages in female dominated industries, generally, ‘women 
were paid less because they would accept less’, and in examining structural factors, ‘women 
                                                 
3 J. Burnette, ‘An Investigation of the Female-Male Wage Gap during the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain’, Economic History Review, no. 2, vol. L, 1997, pp. 257-81. 
4 Burnette, ‘Female-Male Wage Gap’, p. 278. 
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earned less because they were women’.5 The consequences of women’s low pay were evident 
to contemporary observers, and particularly to the socialist critics of the capitalist economy. 
Many women were forced to supplement meagre wages by resorting to prostitution, seeking 
charitable relief or by entering into unsatisfactory marriages as a source of economic security. 
On a more basic level, as Lenin’s wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, observed, women who earned 
lower wages were under nourished in comparison with their male colleagues. Kruspkaya 
identified women’s wage earning capacity as a possible means of securing their economic 
independence.6 Low wages also meant that most working women had insufficient money or 
time to join trade unions or to participate in their activities. It was virtually impossible, 
therefore, for women to campaign collectively for improvements in their own conditions of 
employment, and they often had to rely on sympathetic male colleagues for this. 
 
The plentiful supply of cheap female labour, however, also served to depress wages for male 
workers and gave rise to tensions in the workers’ movement. Many male workers, faced with 
competition from cheaper female labour, were hostile to the very idea of women working for 
wages. If women had to work for wages, men resented the challenge to their patriarchal status 
                                                 
5 R. Glickman, Russian Factory Women: Workplace and Society, 1880-1914, London: 
University of California Press, 1984, pp. 113, 114. 
6 Sablina (N.K. Krupskaya), Zhenshchina-Rabotnitsa (orig., 1901) p. 8. See also E. Wood, 
The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia, Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 29-30, and Glickman, Russian Factory Women, pp. 239-
40. 
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posed by the idea that women could possibly earn as much as men were paid.7 There was also 
some concern amongst more conservative thinkers that women’s independent wage earning 
capacity may encourage wives to leave their husbands. 
 
Although it did not directly address the issue of women’s low pay, the Labour Programme of 
the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, adopted at their 1903 congress, looked to ways 
of protecting the working class from ‘physical and moral degeneration’ by calling for 
restrictions on the hours and conditions of work, the introduction of statutory maternity leave, 
provisions for child care and the regulation of procedures for the payment of wages.8 Despite 
such concerns and the vociferous championing of the minimum wage, the concept of ‘equal 
pay for equal work’ was conspicuously absent from the demands of the 1905 ‘revolutionaries’ 
and, with one or two exceptions, from the programmes of the Russian trade unions which 
emerged in the early years of the twentieth century.9 It was absent too from the ‘bourgeois 
feminist’ programme of the All-Russian Union of Equal Rights for Women and the agenda of 
the 1908 First All-Russian Women’s Congress.10  
 
                                                 
7 Glickman, Russian Factory Women, pp. 159-60. See also J. McDermid and A. Hillyar, 
Midwives of the Revolution: Female Bolsheviks and Women Workers in 1917, London: UCL 
Press, 1999, p. 106. 
8 ‘Programma Rossiiskoi Sotsial-Demokraticheskoi Rabochei Partii’ (1903) in VKP(b) v 
rezolyutsyakh i resheniyakh s”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, Moscow, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 
21-3, and in English translation in Dewar, Labour Policy, pp. 158-9. 
9 Glickman, Russian Factory Women, pp. 198-9. 
10 L.H. Edmondson, Feminism in Russia, 1900-1917, London: Heinemann, 1984. 
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The concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ had emerged as part of the socialist reform agenda 
by 1917, though it was far from a universal demand amongst workers.11 Initially, the political 
debates were framed rather cautiously and were formulated within the remit of a general 
concern to combat poverty and improve overall living standards. The mass expansion of 
female employment during the First World War had depressed the overall level of wages and 
had given rise to calls for the introduction of a minimum wage as a means of securing higher 
rates of pay for both women and men.12 The concentration of the female workers in specific 
areas of production and in particular industries (primarily in unskilled jobs paying the lowest 
wages) allowed only limited scope for comparisons with men of wage payments by identified 
tasks.13 The Bolshevik-sponsored women’s magazine, Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker), however, 
was quick to realise that the minimum wage would only be of real benefit to women if it was 
combined with ‘equal pay for equal work’, a policy which was recognised as problematic 
because of the reception it would receive from male workers and factory committees. Where 
it was in evidence, the support of male workers for ‘equal pay for equal work’ can be viewed 
in two different ways, as Diane Koenker has highlighted: 
 
When we read that striking workers demanded equal pay for men and women, this 
could mean several things: the strikers were idealists and thought women deserved 
                                                 
11 See, for example, J. McDermid and A. Hillyar, Women and Work in Russia, 1880-1930: a 
Study in Continuity through Change, London: Longman, 1998, p. 166. 
12 See, for example, L. S., ‘Vserossiiskaya konferentsiya professional’nykh soyuzov’, 
Rabotnitsa, no. 5, 1917, pp. 2-3, and K. Samoilova, ‘Primer, dostoinyi podrazhaniya’, 
Rabotnitsa, no. 5, 1917, pp. 6-8. 
13 McDermid and Hillyar, Midwives of the Revolution, p. 161. 
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equal pay for equal work, or else strikers hoped that by raising the cost to an employer 
of hiring women, these workers would no longer be a bargain, and their jobs would 
return to men.14 
 
Campaigners for improvements in conditions of employment for women workers continued to 
include the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, alongside pressure for the introduction of 
a minimum wage, and they called on the male-dominated trade unions to support them.15 
Despite these efforts, women remained concentrated in jobs rewarded with the lowest pay. 
 
 
Early Bolshevik Policy on Wages: 
The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ (as distinct from the minimum wage) was 
included in a number of legislative initiatives introduced by the Bolsheviks after the October 
revolution. On 19 January 1918 a decree that set out the norms of wages for Petrograd metal 
workers included the provision that, ‘women workers employed in the same tasks as men in 
quality and quantity shall receive the same wage’.16 On 22 September 1918 minimum pay 
                                                 
14 D. Koenker, ‘Moscow in 1917: the View from Below’, in D.H. Kaiser, ed., The Workers’ 
Revolution in Russia, 1917: the View from Below, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987, pp. 87-8. 
15 N. Sibiryakova, ‘Zhenskii trud i zadachi professional’nykh soyuzov’, Rabotnitsa, no. 7, 
1917, p. 8. 
16 O normakh zarabotnoi platy rabochim metallicheskoi promyshlennosti Petrograda i ego 
okrestnostei, Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 1918, 16 / 242; see also Dewar, 
Labour Policy, p. 165. 
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rates were introduced for adult workers ‘without distinction by sex’.17 The 1918 Labour Code 
stipulated the payment of a minimum wage and set out restrictions on the employment of 
female labour, but did not specifically require ‘equal pay for equal work’.18 The principle 
found further legislative enactment in a June 1920 decree on wage tariffs that stipulated, 
‘women undertaking the same quantity and quality of work as male workers shall be paid the 
same as men’.19 
 
In its early formulations, Soviet wages policy was not only concerned with the principles and 
procedures for the correct payment of wages, but it also embodied concerns for social justice 
by raising overall living standards and reducing levels of social inequality. There were 
attempts to set down a ‘maximum’ as well as a minimum wage and to determine wage 
differentials within predetermined parameters. A grading system setting out the various tariffs 
for wage payments, supplemented by a complex system of grade coefficients, was introduced 
for all waged workers and salaried employees. The grade coefficients were designed to reduce 
the discrepancy in payments between the most lowly and highly paid workers. 
                                                 
17 Decree of VTsIK, O zarabotnoi plate rabochikh i sluzhashchikh v sovetskikh 
uchrezhdeniyakh, Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 1918, 69 / 747; see also 
Dewar, Labour Policy, p. 169. 
18 Decree of VTsIK, Kodeks zakonov o trude, Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 
1918, 87-88 / 918; see also Dewar, Labour Policy, pp. 174-6. On the 1918 Labour Code 
restrictions, see Melanie Ilic, Women Workers in the Soviet Interwar Economy: From 
‘Protection’ to ‘Equality’, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. 
19 Obshchee polozhenie o tarife, Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 1920, 61-2 / 
276; see also Dewar, Labour Policy, p. 195. 
 9 
 
The social justice and welfare foundations of levelling and equalisation embodied in early 
Soviet wages policy soon came under attack. The minimisation of pay differentials was seen 
to have a number of negative consequences. Low wages were a major cause of worker 
dissatisfaction, but wage increases tended to outstrip increases in productivity.20 In practice, 
wage levelling reduced the differentiation between unskilled and skilled workers in such a 
way that it acted as a disincentive for workers to improve their level of skill. Workers also had 
little incentive to raise output or increase their rates of productivity as a means of increasing 
their earnings.21 Insufficient differential in wages also contributed towards the high levels of 
labour turnover as workers changed jobs in the hope of securing a higher wage.22 
 
With the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 and the restoration of 
market relations, the principle of wage levelling was effectively undermined. Wage levelling 
was now criticised for having had a negative impact on industrial productivity. A 10 
September 1921 decree determined that, henceforth, wages were to be directly related to 
levels of output and any increases in payments were only to be permitted in relation to 
increases in productivity.23 The grading system for the payment of wages and salaries was 
simplified to a seventeen point scale with a system of coefficients to determine differentials 
                                                 
20 Barker, Some Problems of Incentives, p. 54, and E.H. Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol. 
1, London: Penguin, 1958,  p. 394. 
21 Barker, Some Problems of Incentives, p. 43. 
22 Freeman, Soviet Worker, p. 169. 
23 Osonovnoe polozhenie po tarifnom voprosu, Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 
1921, 67 / 513; see also Dewar, Labour Policy, pp. 211-12. 
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between unskilled and skilled workers as well as between waged workers and salaried 
employees. The bottom nine grades provided the scale for waged workers, differentiated on a 
ratio of roughly 1:3.5. Including salaried employees, the overall level of differentiation on the 
seventeen point scale was 1:8. The system was designed to encourage workers to acquire 
more skills, but the incentives diminished as workers improved their level of qualifications.24 
The system of grades and coefficients was subject to modifications throughout the interwar 
period. 
 
In November 1921, People’s Commissar for Labour, V.V. Shmidt, spoke at the Zhenotdel 
national congress about the need to improve labour protection measures for women and, more 
generally, on wages policy. He acknowledged the wide variation in wages paid to women, and 
that female workers, especially working girls, were often paid extremely low wages. This had 
allowed employers, including those in state industries, to exploit young women in particular 
by hiring them in place of more expensive male workers. Women were hired more readily 
because they were cheaper, not because they were more productive. Historical experience, 
Shmidt claimed, had shown men to be more productive workers than women in view of their 
physical strength.25 
 
On ‘equal pay for equal work’, Shmidt claimed that if the policy was operative in reality 
employers would employ men rather than women because men were believed to be more 
productive. Current conditions of production, he claimed, required high levels of physical 
                                                 
24 Barker, Some Problems of Incentives, pp. 44-7. 
25 RGASPI 17/10/10/150-2, 171-2, dated 3 November 1921. See also Wood, Baba and the 
Comrade, p. 158. 
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strength and men were more capable of providing this.26 He argued, therefore, that the proper 
implementation of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would lead to a displacement of women from 
production, but that this would be a temporary phenomenon lasting until women achieved 
equivalent levels of productivity. He argued further that it was not in the interests of the trade 
unions to allow the replacement of one group of workers by another and that the labour 
organisations should protect the right to work of all women and men. It was not in women’s 
long term interests for their labour to be devalued in relation to men’s and their wages needed 
to be supported by the policy of ‘equal pay for equal work’.27  
 
It is clear from this example that, despite Bolshevik rhetoric, age old prejudices against the 
employment of women remained in the interwar period. Employers looked to ways of 
minimising expenditure on wages by employing the cheapest sources of labour. It was 
commonly believed that men were more productive workers than women, despite the fact that 
individual studies did not always substantiate this. A study conducted at the ‘Dinamo’ factory 
in 1932, for example, concluded that there was no indication the women were less productive 
than men employed in the same job.28  
 
The protective labour laws introduced by the Bolsheviks after October 1917 also had negative 
consequences for women’s pay and employment prospects in the interwar period, as well as 
differentials in wages. Speaking at a Zhenotdel meeting in 1923, Bolshevik activist 
Aleksandra Kollontai argued that employers preferred to hire older women and girls because 
                                                 
26 RGASPI 17/10/10/173. 
27 RGASPI 17/10/10/173. 
28 GARF 5451/16/ 966/7. 
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they were less likely to become pregnant and, thereby, make claims on the enterprise for 
maternity entitlements.29 In contrast to the pre-revolutionary period, women were now 
sometimes regarded as more costly because of the demands placed on their time by their 
domestic and child care responsibilities.30 In fact, the Soviet government introduced 
legislation around this time that made the dismissal of women who were pregnant or with 
dependent children illegal.31 
 
Workers’ incomes in Soviet Russia were composed of more than a monetary wage, and a 
number of factors need to be taken into account when considering rates of pay. Maternity 
payments were one of a range of social insurance and welfare benefits available to workers. 
The government also sponsored a network of ‘mother and child welfare centres’ and 
nurseries, although these remained underdeveloped throughout the interwar period. Other 
supplementary payments included sickness and disability benefits as well as pensions. Those 
in paid employment were given access to cheap accommodation, rest homes and sanatoria, to 
education and health facilities and vocational training, as well as to supplies of scarce and 
rationed goods. Such provisions were more readily available in urban rather than rural areas 
and contributed to the inequalities of income between industrial and agricultural workers. 
 
Whilst the system of social insurance payments and welfare benefits, and the taxation system, 
may have operated to some extent in such a way as to have a levelling impact on actual 
incomes, other factors contributed towards inequalities in pay. The monetary wage could be 
                                                 
29 RGASPI 17/10/11/140, dated 5 November 1923. 
30 McDermid and Hillyar, Women and Work in Russia, p. 195. 
31 Ilic, Women Workers in the Soviet Interwar Economy, pp. 59-61. 
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supplemented by the payment of bonuses for production above the basic norm of output, with 
awards for exemplary work (such as the economic use of materials or the introduction of 
labour saving production methods), and by payments in kind. Such payments could account 
for significant disparities in actual incomes, but are not always easy to measure. Even in tasks 
where women and men were employed at the same grade, men were often more likely to be 
rewarded with bonuses which boosted their income, as Kingsbury and Fairchild highlighted 
using examples from Elektozavod in 1930: 
 
… with payment including a bonus based on output, the difference in the earnings of 
the sexes within one grade amounted to from three to five per cent. Women in the 
third grade of work, for example, were receiving an average monthly wage of 98 
rubles, men 100 rubles; in the fourth grade, women were averaging 110 rubles, men 
118 rubles; in the fifth grade, women 122 rubles, men 128 rubles.32 
 
The gendered foundations of Soviet protective laws allowed identified groups of workers to 
supplement their incomes, whilst restricting the employment potential of others. Male 
workers were able to supplement their basic wage by overtime work and on night shifts, 
where the employment of women was restricted. Higher wages were paid to workers 
employed in dangerous occupations and in underground tasks, where the employment of 
women was strictly prohibited. Women’s overall earning potential, therefore, was constrained 
in comparison with men’s. Women’s maximum earnings were, on the whole, ‘lower than that 
                                                 
32 Kingsbury and Fairchild, Factory, Family and Woman, pp. 49-50. 
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of men’.33 Such factors need to be taken into account when assessing the inequalities in wages 
between women and men. 
 
Wage variations were not only a function of labour productivity and legal regulations. Actual 
incomes were subject to variations, not only between urban and rural areas or between 
different regions of the country, but also between and within the various industrial sectors. In 
the period immediately following the revolution and during NEP, workers employed in 
privately-owned enterprises were likely to receive higher wages than those in state-run 
enterprises. Workers employed in the male-dominated heavy industrial sector were likely to 
be paid more than those in the female-dominated light industrial and service sectors. Full-time 
and permanent jobs in the industrial sector, where men constituted the majority of the labour 
force before the Second World War, were often better paid than part-time, seasonal, 
temporary and casual jobs, which may have been more suited to women’s employment needs. 
On the other hand, white-collar work, where the employment of women expanded 
significantly in the interwar years, was more highly remunerated than shop-floor jobs in 
industry. 
 
One of the most significant determinants of income variation was the basic system of 
payment. Workers were paid by either piece-rates or by time-rates. The official wage scales 
set out only the minimum level of payment for each grade, but in the 1920s ‘actual earnings 
were far in excess of the wage scales’.34 Despite official concern over the extensive use of 
piece-rates, workers employed under these conditions were more easily able to supplement 
                                                 
33 Kingsbury and Fairchild, Factory, Family and Woman, pp. 49-50. 
34 Dewar, Labour Policy, p. 135. 
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their basic wage by raising levels of output in excess of the established norm s.35 Insofar as 
‘equal pay for equal work’ was concerned, Dewar conceded that, ‘thus, workers of the same 
grade and skill, often working under identical conditions, received totally different wages’.36 
Louis Fischer similarly pointed out that ‘men on the same job, on the same kind of machine, 
earn different incomes. Individual effort and ability determine earning power’.37  More men 
were employed on a system of piece-rate payments, leaving women in a disadvantageous 
position. 
 
The Soviet government and trade unions collected detailed data on the changing structure and 
composition of the industrial labour force and wage rates during the interwar period. Some of 
this data has found its way into publications, but much more survives in the archives. These 
studies took place at the level of individual enterprises and in different regions of the country. 
In their generalised and summative format they offer an overview of the composition of the 
Soviet labour force according to levels of skill, and thereby wage differentials, as well as sex, 
age and even occasionally ethnic origin. 
 
In addition to the studies of labour force composition, the government statistical bureaux 
undertook the collection of detailed wage data in the mid-1920s and again in 1934. These data 
set out the actual average basic monetary wage payments made to workers employed in 
different sectors of industry for the whole month of March in the years from 1924 to 1928, 
                                                 
35 Carr, Socialism in One Country, pp. 383-93. 
36 Dewar, Labour Policy, p. 136. 
37 Louis Fischer, Machines and Men in Russia, New York: H. Smith, 1932, p. 160. 
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and in October in 1934.38 Some of the published data give an indication of the proportion of 
the labour force employed on a system of piece-rate payments, the average level of skill, 
including grade coefficient, the number of days worked during the month, as well as the 
proportional breakdown of wage payments to workers according to a set of cohorts. They also 
give an indication of the different rates of pay earned by women and men. 
 
Women’s wage rates remained substantially lower than men’s throughout the interwar period, 
and this contributed to their general social inequality.39 It is commonly accepted that this was 
because women were less skilled (with lower levels of literacy, education and vocational 
training) than men, and that they worked fewer hours. According to this argument, therefore, 
women were in receipt of a ‘market wage’ which reflected their lesser contribution to 
industrial productivity and output. Kingsbury and Fairchild suggest: 
 
Women, at present, still have less training and education than men; as their lives are 
now organised it may be that they have less enduring energy. At all events, they do 
work requiring less skill, on the average, than men do and their output tends to be 
lower. They earn, therefore, a correspondingly less wage than men earn, but only a 
correspondingly less wage.40 
                                                 
38 144,000 women workers were included in the March 1924 study; 179,600 in March 1925; 
and 193,000 women (and 450,300 men) in March 1926. See A. Rashin, ‘Zarabotnaya plata 
rabotnits v 1924-1926 gg.’, Statisticheskoe obozrenie, no. 2, 1927, p. 73. 
39 On social inequality, see, for example, A. Artyukhina, ‘XIV s"ezd VKP(b) i nashi zadachi’, 
Kommunistka, no. 1, 1926, p. 11. 
40 Kingsbury and Fairchild, Factory, Family and Woman, p. 52. 
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The relative improvement in women’s earnings in the 1920s, it has been suggested, can be 
accounted for by slight changes in the length of the working day (women now worked longer 
hours than men in some industries) and by the fact that more women were in paid 
employment, largely at the expense of the jobs of young workers who were being displaced 
from the labour force.41 The widening of pay differentials in the 1930s, brought about by 
Stalin’s reforms of wage payments, benefited white-collar employees rather than blue-collar 
workers, and tended to raise the wages of those in already more highly paid jobs, who tended 
to be men rather than women.42 A more detailed study of the available wage data allows us to 
test these hypotheses. 
 
 
Women's Wages in the 1920s: 
An investigation of the materials and statistical data about the differences in wage rates 
between women and men in the 1920s reveals the following trends.43 On average for all 
sectors of industry, the relative difference between women and men’s daily and monthly 
earnings in the years 1924 to 1926 varied insignificantly. Women’s wages ranged around 64.3 
per cent of men's daily wages and 63 per cent of monthly levels of pay. The gap between 
women’s and men’s earnings was far less pronounced in the light industrial sectors, where the 
majority of women workers were employed, than in the male-dominated heavy industrial 
                                                 
41 Bergson, Structure of Soviet Wages, pp. 73-6. 
42 Bergson, Structure of Soviet Wages, pp. 124-6. 
43 Data cited here are from Rashin, ‘Zarabotnaya plata’, pp. 73-8. 
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sectors, where women were more likely to be employed as semi-skilled, unskilled and 
auxiliary workers.  
 
Statistical data offer a more detailed breakdown of wages. Women were more likely to be 
located in the low to middle wage ranges, whilst men were more likely to be found in the 
middle to high ranges. Only 0.5 per cent of women in industrial employment, compared with 
13.4 per cent of men, earned more than one hundred rubles per month in 1926. Yet the 
differences between women’s and men’s earnings can only be partly accounted for by the fact 
that women workers were concentrated in the unskilled and lesser skilled, and thereby the 
lower paying, jobs. 
 
A more detailed study of the daily wage rates for women and men employed in the same jobs, 
that is of 'equal pay for equal work', reveals the extent of the wage gap. Even for skilled and 
semi-skilled workers in a variety of industries women’s pay ranged from a low of 72.2 per 
cent (lathe operators in the military supply industries in March 1924) to 99.1 per cent (dyers 
in the cotton textiles industry also in March 1924). Whereas some of the jobs investigated 
witnessed improvements in women's relative pay rates by March 1926, others saw a decline 
(including dyers). 
 
Rates of pay were even more differentiated for women and men in unskilled jobs. For 
example, unskilled women workers in the paper industry earned only 51.6 per cent of the 
equivalent male monthly wage in 1926. Women in the garment industry fared much better, 
receiving 94.2 per cent of the equivalent male wage. The official explanation for this 
discrepancy pointed to women's weaker physical capacity and the ready supply of labour for 
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such jobs. In unskilled jobs requiring less physical strength, in the food and printing industry, 
for example, the gap between women and men's earnings was significantly less pronounced. 
 
The patterns of wage differentiation found in industry were repeated in the white-collar 
sector. A study of the earnings of white-collar workers in 1926 revealed a far lower level of 
differentiation between women and men.44 Yet even here, where there was a potential to earn 
higher wages than in industry, women were concentrated in the lower and middle wage 
ranges, and were significantly less likely to be found in the more highly paid jobs. Only 5.7 
per cent of women, compared to 23.7 per cent of men, earned more than one hundred rubles 
per month. 
 
For white-collar workers, the earnings of women and men employed in the same job could 
vary greatly: women book-keepers earned only 74.4 per cent of their male counterparts in 
1926, although female supervisors earned 96.7 per cent of the wages of their male colleagues. 
More women were to be found in the lower paying white-collar jobs, and men dominated the 
professions attracting higher rates of pay. 
 
A study of women workers in the textile industry in March 1927 offers a variety of 
explanations for women's lower levels of pay.45 This study suggested that women's monthly 
earnings were lower than men's, even in comparison with daily earnings, because women 
                                                 
44 E. Reshetova, ‘Differentsiatsiya zarabotnoi platy sluzhashchikh v Marte 1926’, Statistika 
truda, no. 11-12, 1926, cited in Rashin, ‘Zarabotnaya plata’. 
45 V. Borodin, ‘Zhenskii trud v tekstil'noi promyshlennosti’, Statisticheskoe obozrenie, no. 9, 
1928, pp. 62-7. 
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were more often absent from work, simply ‘resting’ or because of leave relating to pregnancy 
and child birth. (It is important to note here, however, that other studies of absenteeism in 
industry provide evidence that would challenge this claim, especially if maternity leave is 
taken into account). As in other sectors of industry, women are found clustered in the lower 
income groups, with only 15.1 per cent earning more than 60 rubles per month, compared 
with 50.5 per cent of men in this sector. Women received lower wages, it was argued, because 
they had fewer qualifications and lower levels of skill than men. The average grade for 
women workers in the textile industry was 4.1, as compared to 5.7 for men. For the textile 
industry as a whole, the vast majority of women (almost 90 per cent) were working in grades 
three to six, with extremely few rising to grade seven or above. As in other sectors of 
industry, mostly men were to be found in the higher grades, especially grades nine to thirteen. 
The absence of women from the higher grades was offered as an explanatory factor 
accounting for their lower levels of pay. 
 
Wage differences were far less defined within individual grades. Yet, even here, men were 
often assigned a slightly higher grade coefficient than women working on the same job. As a 
result, women's wages could be as much as 13 per cent lower than men’s for the same job. 
Few of these jobs placed significant physical demands on workers. Male ‘strength’, therefore, 
could not in itself explain this difference. Some tasks, it was argued, were slightly more 
complex than others, and women were often assigned to the less complex tasks within the 
same grade as male colleagues. Yet, even taking this into account, in most jobs men’s wages 
still exceeded women’s by up to eight per cent. Occasionally, such variations in grading and 
coefficients sometimes favoured women, who could earn more than their male colleagues for 
the same, or broadly similar, tasks. Where women were paid less, it was argued, they were 
marginally less ‘qualified’ for the job. 
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A variety of factors accounted for these differences in levels of ‘qualifications’, most notably 
age and length of work experience (stazh). Women workers in the textile industry were, on 
the whole, younger and less experienced in industrial employment than their male colleagues. 
Yet even where women did have a long record of industrial employment, it appears that they 
were less likely to be promoted to more highly skilled work than men. Despite significant 
increases in wage payments in the 1920s, there is no evidence of improvement in women’s 
relative wage rates for the textile industry as a whole from 1924 to 1927. In fact, there had 
been no improvement even over the pre-revolutionary differentials in pay between women 
and men. 
 
The study of women workers in the textile industry also includes an analysis of the household 
budgets of textile workers’ families using data collected in November 1926. In view of the 
relatively low wages paid to textile workers, secondary wages made an important contribution 
to the incomes of families headed by textile workers. In such families, secondary wages 
constituted 28.3 per cent of household income, compared to only seven per cent in other 
households. In these years, the wives and adult daughters of male textile workers were more 
likely to be in employment than those of married male workers in other sectors. Women in 
this sector, therefore, unless they themselves were heads of households, were regarded as 
secondary wage earners. This factor alone, it could be argued, may have been used to justify 
their lower rates of pay. As may be expected, time budget surveys revealed that women spent 
marginally less time than men working for wages, but only a matter of a few minutes per day, 
but they had by far the greater responsibility for unpaid household management. 
 
Customary Wages: 
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Not all contemporary observers were willing to accept the official explanations for the 
inequalities of pay between women and men. Two case studies illustrate this point.  
 
In a study of women's labour in the Moscow region, Nefedov argued that women workers had 
traditionally been paid less than men simply because they were women.46 Nefedov argued 
that such factors as the level of productivity, the costs and benefits of employing women 
instead of men and the impact of labour protection measures had not been adequately studied. 
For Moscow industries as a whole, by the 1920s women's wages had improved relative to 
men's in comparison with pre-revolutionary levels of pay (using data for 1908). Women 
received only 59.9 per cent of the male wage in 1908, but this had increased to 70.1 per cent 
by 1923. Yet, for some reason, the proportion had declined again to 64.1 per cent by 1925. 
Individual sectors of industry offered different results, however. What appears to have been 
the case from the statistical evidence provided by Nefedov can be summarised briefly: the 
industrial sectors where the discrepancies between women and men's pay had been greatest 
(metallurgy and printing, for example) witnessed a closing of the pay gap by the 1920s; but 
where women had received a greater proportion of the male wage than average, the pay gap 
had increased. The most notable decline in women’s relative wages was witnessed in the 
chemical industry. Women earned 84.7 per cent of the male wage in 1908, but this had 
declined to 73.1 per cent by 1925. 
 
Nefedov argued that it was no longer acceptable to pay a woman less simply because she was 
a woman (using the derogatory term baba in inverted commas). Workers needed to take 
‘equal pay for equal work’ seriously, and adopt this as practice in their collective and tariff 
                                                 
46 M. Nefedov, Zhenskii trud v Moskovskoi gubernii, Moscow, 1926, pp. 38-43. 
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agreements. In future, improvements in women’s wages would result from wage rises for all 
workers.47 Wage rises could also be the outcome of increases in productivity and, most 
importantly, improvements in women’s qualifications.48 
 
A 1929 study by Goltsman focused specifically on the wages of women white-collar 
workers.49 Goltsman noted that women were less likely to find employment in the most 
demanding and complex jobs in the administrative and service sector, but they dominated the 
more simple and routine tasks, such as typing and cleaning. Many important administrative 
posts, and even jobs in trade, had been closed to women in tsarist times, meaning that after 
1917 women had little experience of professional practice. According to Goltsman, in some 
areas of work conservative attitudes had survived the revolution, and many still considered 
women by nature unsuited to professional employment. Such attitudes also hindered women's 
professional promotion. 
 
In low and middle level administrative and service jobs, where women and men worked 
alongside each other, Goltsman noted that men received from 10 to 15 per cent higher wages 
than women. This pay gap increased significantly in the more highly paid areas of white-
collar work, where far fewer women were employed. ‘Conservative attitudes’ on the part of 
                                                 
47 This view was endorsed by the trade unions. See, for example, A. Tikhomirova, ‘III plenum 
VTsSPS i nashi zadachi’, Kommunistka, no. 3, 1926, p. 47. 
48 See, for example, O. Anikst, ‘Kvalifikatsiya rabotnits’, Kommunistka, no. 3, 1926, pp. 48-
53. 
49 M. Goltsman, ‘Zarabotnaya plata zhenshchin-sluzhashchikh’, Statisticheskoe obozrenie, no. 
5, 1929, pp. 58-60. 
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employers and supervisors were blamed for the persistence of wage inequalities. As earlier 
studies had shown, even where women and men were employed in exactly the same job, men 
were often paid more than women, by as much as 25-35 per cent in book-keeping, for 
example. This study also recognised that the relative rates of pay for women and men varied 
between the major cities and towns, as well as between enterprises. 
 
 
Women's Wages in the 1930s: 
There is far less data available for the study of women's wages in the 1930s. Despite the 
continued systematic gathering of wage data by the Soviet statistical agencies, in this decade 
rates of pay were rarely differentiated by sex. The data used here relate mostly to October 
1934, with the addition of a few case studies located in the archives. 
 
In October 1934, the Central Administration of National Economic Records (TsUNKhU) of 
the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and the Statistical Sector of the All-Union Central 
Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) gathered wages data from four separate machine-building 
enterprises.50 The report, which does not appear to have been published, cautioned that the 
limited scope of the data provided insufficient evidence to be able to draw any general 
conclusions about women's wages, but it could be used to illustrate the typical situation in a 
number of enterprises. The study included only those workers who were employed for the 
                                                 
50 RGAE 4372/33/1010/1-5: ‘Zarabotnaya plata zhenshchin v chetyrekh predpriyatiyakh 
Metallo i Elektropromyshelennosti’, dated 7 March 1935. The study examined Elektrozavod, 
Dinamo, Gosshveimashina and Kol’chuginskii medeobrabatyvayushchii zavod. 
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whole month of October 1934 and only those tasks where women and men worked alongside 
each other. 
 
The report noted that women’s level of skill, and consequently their wages, still lagged behind 
that of men. Women’s predominant placement in the lower grades was accounted for by their 
younger age and shorter work experience. Yet, as was acknowledged, this was not a sufficient 
explanation. Again, this report complained of conservatism on the part of economic managers, 
who were reluctant to promote women to skilled work. The report offered details of hourly 
rates of pay, where, on the whole, women were paid less than men. However, there was 
significant evidence to suggest that in some of the female-dominated lower grades women’s 
hourly rates of pay exceeded men’s, but in the higher grades men were always paid more than 
women. The wage gap at these grades, it was argued, resulted partly from the different levels 
of technical know-how and productivity. The report concluded that, ‘the discrepancy in wages 
between men and women is a consequence of women’s lower qualifications and their lesser 
production experience’.51 
 
The limited amount of published statistical data on women’s wages in this period possibly 
draws on this data in part.52 The published data is limited to the machine-building and the 
textile industries in October 1934, and a small number of occupations on state farms in 
September 1934. Despite the paucity of statistical data, there is again evidence to suggest that 
women workers in the lower grades were sometimes paid wages that exceeded those of their 
                                                 
51 RGAE 4372/33/1010/1ob. 
52 I.A. Kraval’, Zhenshchina v SSSR, Moscow, 1937, pp. 111-13. 
 26 
male colleagues. However, the wage gap moved rapidly in men’s favour as the grade of work 
became higher. 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Even if it could be shown convincingly that women were paid a market wage in the Soviet 
Union in the interwar period, we would also need to examine the customary practices, 
sometimes supported by legal enactment, which denied women access to training and jobs in 
such a way that they could not improve their levels of skill and increase their earnings. A 
‘glass ceiling’ clearly existed in the interwar Soviet Union, which women workers in industry 
and women white-collar employees found difficult to move beyond. Training and promotion 
took them so far, but rarely to the top. Long held prejudices against working women and sex 
discrimination in the workplace did not disappear overnight after the October revolution. 
From the evidence examined here, the Bolshevik agenda for the introduction and development 
of a socialist wages policy in the interwar period was far from dominated by a genuine 
discussion of the implementation of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. 
 
